

# **ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ**

## **ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ**

**Ειδικός Γραπτός Διαγωνισμός για θέσεις Ακολούθου στην  
Εξωτερική Υπηρεσία της Δημοκρατίας**

**Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Δημοκρατίας**

**Αρ. 5010 ημερ. 10.02.2017**

**ΕΝΟΤΗΤΑ ΣΤ: ΑΓΓΛΙΚΗ ΓΛΩΣΣΑ**

**Ημερομηνία: 11 Σεπτεμβρίου 2018**

**Διάρκεια: 3 ώρες**

## **Part I – Essay (50 points)**

Write an essay, of approximately 1000 words, on ONE (1) of the following subjects:

1. "The European Union's internal security is sometimes placed under threat by its own citizens, due to the failure of the Union and its member states to provide truly inclusive societies that respect diversity without sidelining minorities." Discuss, with reference to the recent terrorist attacks in Europe.
2. At a time when the effectiveness of multilateralism is doubted by many, the EU finds itself faced with ongoing - if not additional - challenges. What do you think is the cause for this state of affairs, and how can the Union react to it? What does it imply for the EU's foreign policy?

## Part II – Comprehension (40 points)

Please find below an excerpt from an article posted on the website of the European Council on Foreign Relations on July 16, 2018. Read it carefully and respond to the questions that follow it.

### *Three years later: Europe's last push on the Iran nuclear deal*

*Ellie Geranmayeh, ECFR*

The Iran nuclear agreement marked its third anniversary in a gloomy state. Despite repeated attempts to keep him on board, US President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the deal – signed on 14 July 2015 under the formal title the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – and thereby pulled the rug from under Europe's feet. European policymakers are now focused on salvaging the agreement. For a growing number of European corporate decision-makers, the deal is already dead. In reality, the JCPOA is on life support and the next few months could open either its next or final chapter. Despite the significant challenges they face, European governments have some limited time to avert the deal's collapse.

In 2015, global powers unanimously hailed the agreement as a historic achievement that proved the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy. Indeed, the JCPOA provides unprecedented oversight of Iran's nuclear programme. Furthermore, the agreement's preface states that the parties anticipate it will "positively contribute to regional and international peace and security". Many hoped that the resolution of the nuclear dispute would result in a new understanding between the West and Iran, opening a pathway for detente rather than confrontation. Relations between Europe and Iran have certainly made gains in this direction, but the Trump administration's maximalist stance on Tehran has created an extremely hazardous environment for all remaining stakeholders in the nuclear deal.

Since the formal US exit from the agreement in May this year, the Trump administration has sought to sabotage European efforts to sustain the agreement. This has involved a policy of relentlessly threatening and otherwise pressuring any country or company inclined to maintain economic channels with Iran, by weaponising US **secondary sanctions**. Reportedly, the US administration recently rejected an appeal by the EU foreign ministers to negotiate broad exemptions to such sanctions for European companies. The US clearly intends to specifically target European trade with Iran – although there remain questions about its ability to do so and the reach of US enforcement.

Together with its allies in the Middle East – particularly Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia – the Trump administration is increasing its efforts to squeeze Iran on multiple fronts. This anti-Iran front views the collapse of the JCPOA as the trigger for a wider policy aimed at confronting Iran. The policy seeks to cause a deep economic crisis in the country, creating domestic divisions intended to bring about regime change. As part of this, the Trump administration has signalled its willingness to go further than any previous administration by choking off Iran's oil exports.

European leaders' have repeatedly stated their commitment to upholding the JCPOA. Policymakers are making genuine efforts to find an economic package that minimises the impact of looming US secondary sanctions to sustain Iranian compliance with the deal. But these efforts have yet to generate an environment in which a reasonable number of European entities can make a firm commercial decision to continue doing business with Iran.

Although the European Union's leaders remain unified in their support of the JCPOA, divisions are emerging between the 28 member states over how far they are willing to test the limits of US secondary sanctions. Moreover, several proposed ideas for safeguarding European companies against extraterritorial US sanctions would require months or even years to implement, as they require alternative financial mechanisms that are ring-fenced from US exposure. European governments are also falling short in the political momentum needed to salvage the nuclear deal. For instance, Germany and the United Kingdom are now far more preoccupied with challenges at home than they were in 2015, and EU institutions are focused on averting further transatlantic divide on trade and NATO.

Unsurprisingly, many European firms have little confidence that European policymakers will create the conditions necessary to protect them from US secondary sanctions, including by providing alternative mechanisms for doing business with Iran that are compliant with US sanctions. This has resulted in a wave of **pre-emptive corporate overcompliance** with impending US regulations and a decline in European business with Iran even before sanctions come into force.

This month, the foreign ministers of France, the UK, Germany, Russia, and China (the E3+2) met with Iran to discuss political and economic pathways through which they could safeguard the JCPOA. And Iran's president, Hassan Rouhani, visited Austria and Switzerland to deliver two overarching messages. The first was that Iran's patience was wearing thin and its full compliance with the JCPOA was only feasible if it continued to receive tangible benefits from the agreement. The second was that Tehran would abandon the agreement if it

became unable to maintain oil exports and, accordingly, its share in global energy markets.

Rouhani's visit followed a tense OPEC meeting, Trump's call for Saudi Arabia to increase oil production, and weeks of speculation about the extent to which the US could pressure other countries to halt exports of Iranian oil. In Europe, Rouhani stated: "assuming that Iran could become the only oil producer unable to export its oil is a wrong assumption".

The leader of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was quick to emphasise that elite forces were prepared to act on Rouhani's words, noting: "we will make the enemy understand that either everyone can use the Strait of Hormuz or no one". Iran has issued such warnings in the past, including during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and in 2011 in advance of the EU and US embargo on Iranian oil. Iran may retaliate against any US attempts to curb its oil exports by disrupting regional crude shipments in the strait, through which 35% of all seaborne oil exports pass. Such measures seem unlikely for now – given the risk of military escalation with US and regional naval forces, and of damaging relations with China and Russia, which wish to keep energy markets stable.

Rouhani's statement suggests that Iran is hardening its position. Qassem Suleimani, commander of the IRGC's Quds Force, unexpectedly welcomed Rouhani's threat.

Despite the significant political and economic challenges shaping Iranian domestic politics, the Trump administration's maximalist posture may inadvertently lead to a consensus between the Rouhani government and the military elite on how to respond to national security threats. This may abruptly or gradually prompt the Iranian political establishment to shift away from diplomacy with Europe and towards confrontation with the US. Calculations on whether the JCPOA can be sustained will heavily influence this decision.

Iran is likely to continue implementing the JCPOA and engaging in diplomacy with Europe for at least a few more months, as it assesses the impact of US sanctions on its economic relations with Europe, China, and India (particularly in relation to oil exports), as well as the likely trajectory of US domestic politics in the aftermath of midterm elections.

Unless one side backs down, Tehran and Washington will escalate their dispute in a manner that poses real risks to European interests in non-proliferation, security in the Middle East, and global energy supply. It is imperative that in the coming weeks and months European governments redouble their efforts to sustain the nuclear agreement and ease regional tensions.

## QUESTIONS

1. Summarise the article using no more than 300 words (20 points)
2. What, according to the text, is the US administration's aim in withdrawing from the JCPOA? (4 points)
3. To what extent are European efforts at salvaging the deal succeeding? Why? (4 points)
4. In what way, according to the text, could this plan of the US administration not yield the desired effects? (4 points)
5. Please explain the meaning of "secondary sanctions" in the context used in the text (4 points)
6. Please explain the meaning of "pre-emptive corporate overcompliance" in the context used in the text. (4 points)

### Part III – Grammar (10 points)

Fill in the gaps in the text with the correct forms of the words below. Do not use the same word twice. Three words are redundant. The answer to “number zero” is provided as an example, using the word “emerge”. (1 point for each answer, 10 points in total)

ALERT – COMPROMISE – EMERGE – FAIL

HARNESS – INITIATE - INFILTRATE – INVADE – MALICE

OBSERVE – PREVAIL – REPLICATE – SUBTREFUGE – WREAK

The Stuxnet Worm first .....(0) during the summer of 2010. Stuxnet was a 500-kilobyte computer worm that .....(1) numerous computer systems. This virus operated in three steps. First, it analyzed and targeted Windows networks and computer systems. The worm, having infected these machines, began to continually .....(2) itself. Next, the machine attacked the Windows-based “Step7” software. This software system was and continues to be .....(3) in industrial computing networks, such as nuclear enrichment facilities. Lastly, by .....(4) the Step7 software, the worm gained access to the industrial program logic controllers. This final step gave the worm's creators access to crucial industrial information as well as giving them the ability to operate various machinery at the individual industrial sites. The multiplication process previously discussed is what made the worm so rampant. It was so .....(5) that if a USB was plugged into an infected system, the worm would infect the USB device and spread to any subsequent computing systems that the USB was plugged in to.

Over fifteen Iranian facilities were attacked by the Stuxnet worm. It is believed that this attack was .....(6) by a random worker's USB drive. One of the affected industrial facilities was the Natanz nuclear facility where inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency .....(7) that a strange number of uranium enriching centrifuges were breaking. The cause of these .....(8) was unknown at the time. Later in 2010, Iran technicians contracted computer security specialists in Belarus to examine their computer systems. This security firm eventually discovered multiple .....(9) files on the Iranian computer systems. It has subsequently revealed that these files were the Stuxnet worm. It is estimated that the Stuxnet worm .....(10) havoc on 984 uranium enriching centrifuges. By current estimations this constituted a 30% decrease in enrichment efficiency.

(excerpt from an article by Michael Holloway, 16 July 2015)